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Abstract
The paper constructs credit shocks using data and the solution
to a monetary business cycle model. The model extends the stan-
dard stochastic cash-in-advance economy by including the production
of credit that serves as an alternative to money in exchange. Shocks
to goods productivity, money, and credit productivity are constructed
robustly using the solution to the model and quarterly US data on key
variables. The contribution of the credit shock to US GDP movements
is found, and this is interpreted in terms of changes in banking legis-
lation during the US financial deregulation era. The results put forth
the credit shock as a candidate shock that matters in determining
GDP, including in the sense of Uhlig (2003).
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1 Introduction
Identifying the sources of shocks that influence the real business cycle has be-
come the focus of recent research. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2003) and
Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider how policy may explain capital, labor
and goods distortions that contribute to business cycle fluctuations. Uhlig
(2003) in contrast takes an atheoretical approach to decomposing fluctuations
into certain candidate shocks, finding that a medium range output produc-
tivity shock and a shorter range less discernible shock together explain a
good portion of the fluctuations. Meanwhile, Espino and Hintermaier (2004)
extend Kocherlakota’s (2000) formulation of the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
intertemporal credit shock by constructing a real business cycle with credit
constraints.
A credit shock may make a viable candidate for causing some of the out-
put fluctuations, although this still remains little explored within the business
cycle framework. One alternative to intertemporal credit is the use of credit
for exchange purposes, where the credit is produced in a banking sector us-
ing real resources. With this production of credit approach, Einarsson and
Marquis (2001) examine the movements of credit aggregates in a monetary
business cycle model with banking, while Li (2000) presents a credit model
that exhibits some of the classic liquidity eﬀects when open market opera-
tions must pass through financial intermediaries. While neither of the latter
two papers introduce a shock to the credit sector, there is a separate liter-
ature on banking as a source of innovations. This includes Berger (2003),
who documents technological progress in the banking sector, and Strahan
(2003), who presents econometric evidence of how US bank deregulation has
acted as a positive shock that has contributed to GDP increases. Strahan
(2003) estimates how asset structures in the banking industry changed signif-
icantly after branching and interstate banking deregulations, how the bank
profit rate became sharply more correlated with its subsequent asset growth
following the 1980s deregulation, and how US state panel data show that
the states’s growth rate of personal income accelerated by 0.56 percentage
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points following branching deregulation.1 Thus bank law deregulations have
been specifically linked to structural change in the banking industry and US
output growth rate increases.
The paper here contributes a study of how credit shocks aﬀect output in a
credit production framework. The model includes credit as an alternative to
money in a stochastic exogenous growth version of Gillman and Kejak (2005),
with shocks to the productivity of credit along with the more traditional
shocks to output productivity and to money supply. From the solution to
the monetary business cycle model, the credit shock is constructed each year
using data as in Parkin (1988), Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994),
and Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1997). Then the contribution of the
shock to GDP changes is estimated. Further the paper follows the spirit of
Kehoe and Prescott (2002) by attributing the source of the shocks to changes
in legislation, specifically banking legislation. The shocks are compared to
the major law changes during the national US financial deregulation that
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. A significant ability to correlate the shock-
induced GDP movements with the deregulation is found.
The model’s recursive solution is used along with US data to construct
the shocks in a robust fashion. The profile of the credit shock is found to be
stable under some six diﬀerent ways of estimating it. Along with the model’s
solution, at least three variables need to be assigned values with time series
data in order to minimally identify the three shocks. Five such variables
are found to be available and all are used for the baseline, by employing an
estimation procedure to identify the three shocks from five equations. Al-
ternative constructions are also made for robustness; it is found that the
nearly identical shock profile results in all cases when variables associated
with sectors in which the three shocks occur in the model are included in the
construction. And this includes two cases in which there is exact identifica-
tion of the shocks.2
1This updates a previous study by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) that finds that the
states’s growth rate accelerated by 0.5 to 1 percentage points following deregulation during
the 1972 to 1992 period.
2Kocherlakota Ingram and Savin (1994) describe how the identification of a model’s
shock can diﬀer depending on which equilibrium conditions are selected to solve for the
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As an added characterization of the credit shock, its contribution to the
variance of the output is also presented. This variance is found to vary widely,
a verification of the Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994) finding that the
contribution of an individual shock to variance can have a wide range of
values, depending for example on its ordering in the VAR. However, since
the shock construction procedure uses only the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of
the shock processes, this uncertain variance decomposition does not aﬀect the
construction. Further, the estimated autocorrelation that results from the
time series for the constructed credit shock is close in value to the assumed
value used in the construction, a feature that adds validation.
The paper therefore presents a rigorous testing of the hypothesis that
shocks to credit technology may play a role in explaining the output fluc-
tuations during certain historical episodes. Although it does not go as far
as to combine an intertemporal credit role with the exchange credit func-
tion in the model, the paper shows that the exchange credit function itself
may be important during periods when the use of credit for exchange is sig-
nificantly shocked. For example, consider the lifting of Regulation Q. The
unrestricted ability to write checks on money market mutual funds that are
invested in short term government treasury securities allowed the consumer
a greater chance to earn interest during the period while purchasing goods
with credit, instead of using cash. Such an eﬃciency increase can induce the
investment of more funds during each period rather than keeping them idle
as cash, and cause a jolt to GDP.
The approach of linking a change in policies with the source of shocks
is consistent with a growing literature on decomposing total factor produc-
tivity changes. Examples are found in Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2002),
Cole and Ohanian (2002) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002). And finally the
paper is able to show that several of the features of Uhlig’s (2003) second,
unidentified, shorter term shock are satisfied by the credit shock of our model.
Taken together, the construction of the shock and its eﬀect on GDP, the link
shock in combination with the data. Here, rather than using an arbitrary selection of
equilibrium conditions, the approach is to use the recursive solution to the model which
embodies the entire set of equilibrium conditions.
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of the shock to certain policy changes, and its partial conformity with the
atheoretical shock identified by Uhlig (2003), allows the conclusion that the
credit shock is a viable, previously unidentified, candidate shock that can
significantly aﬀect output during certain periods.
2 The Credit Model
The representative agent self produces credit with labor only and buys the ag-
gregate consumption good with a combination of money and credit, whereby
the marginal cost of money (the nominal interest rate) equals the marginal
cost of credit (the real wage divided by the marginal product of labor in
credit production). The credit production exhibits a rising marginal cost as
the share of credit used in exchange goes up. The particular form of the
credit production function is equivalent to the assumption that the value-
added from the credit service is proportional to the cost of production.
With an explicit price for the credit service as in Gillman and Kejak
(2004), it can be shown that this assumption implies that the total revenue
from selling the credit service (the value-added) is proportional to the wage
cost, leaving a constant rate of profit. This proportionality of the value added
with the total cost implies that as total consumption rises, so must the labor
input into credit services in order to keep constant the share of credit in
exchange. Then the implied production function can be written simply in
terms of the share of credit being equal to a diminishing function of the ratio
of labor in credit production relative to the total good consumption.
The credit production specification allows for an additional productivity
shock. Instead of just good productivity and money shocks, there are three
shocks also including one to the productivity of credit.
Consider a representative consumer that maximizes over an infinite hori-
zon its expected lifetime utility over consumption ct and leisure xt. Utility
is given by:
U = E0
∞X
t=0
βt(log ct +Ψ log xt) 0 < β < 1. (1)
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The consumer can purchase the goods by using either money or credit
services. Let at ∈ (0, 1] denote the fraction of consumption goods that are
purchased with money. Then the consumer’s cash-in-advance constraint will
have the form:
Mt−1 + Tt ≥ atPtct, (2)
whereMt−1is the money stock carried from the previous period, Tt is the nom-
inal lump-sum money transfer received from the government and Pt denotes
the current price level. It is assumed that the government policy includes
sequences of nominal transfers which satisfy:
Tt = ΘtMt−1 = (Θ∗ + eut − 1)Mt−1, (3)
where Θt is the growth rate of money and Θ∗ is the stationary growth rate
of money. Transfer is subject to random shocks ut which follow the autore-
gressive process:
ut = ϕuut−1 + ut, ut ∼ N(0, σ2u), 0 < ϕu < 1. (4)
The amount of credit used is equal to ct(1−at). The production function
for this amount of credit is given by
ct(1− at) = AFevt
µ
lFt
ct
¶γ
ct, AF > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1).
This can be written as
1− at = AFevt
µ
lFt
ct
¶γ
, (5)
where 1−at is the share of goods bought with credit, AFevt is the productivity
shift parameter and lFt is the labor time spent in producing credit services.
There exists productivity shocks that follow an autocorrelated process:
vt = ϕvvt−1 + vt, vt ∼ N(0, σ2v), 0 < ϕv < 1. (6)
Assume a total time endowment of 1, which is divided among time spent
working, leisure and time spent in credit service production:
nt + xt + lFt = 1. (7)
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Output yt is produced by the agent, acting in part as the representative
firm, from capital accumulated in the previous period kt−1 and current la-
bor nt using a Cobb-Douglas CRS production function which is subject to
technology shocks zt:
yt = eztkαt−1n
1−α
t , (8)
zt = ϕzzt−1 + zt, zt ∼ N(0, σ2v), 0 < ϕz < 1. (9)
The part of output that is not consumed is invested in physical capital.
Current investment it together with depreciated capital form the capital stock
used for production in the next period:
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it. (10)
Firms maximize their profits yt− rtkt−1−wtnt+ (1− δ)kt−1, which yield
the following functions for wt, the real wage rate and rt, the gross real rate
of return, net of depreciation δ:
wt = (1− α)eztkαt−1n−αt , (11)
rt = αeztkα−1t−1 n
1−α
t + 1− δ. (12)
Current income from labor, capital, money balances and lump-sum trans-
fers are spent on consumption, new capital formation and the accumulation of
real balances. The period t budget constraint of the representative consumer
is given by:
wtPt(1− xt − lFt) + Ptrtkt−1 + Tt +Mt−1 ≥ Ptct + Ptkt +Mt. (13)
The consumer chooses consumption, leisure, time spent in credit service
production, capital stock, credit service purchase and money balance path
{ct, xt, lFt, kt, at,Mt}∞t=0 to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to the cash-
in-advance constraint (2), budget constraint (13) and credit service technol-
ogy (5).
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2.1 Equilibrium
Dividing equations (2) and (13) by the price level and substituting lFt ex-
pressed from (5), the Lagrangian of the maximization problem of the house-
hold is
L = E
∞X
t=0
βt{(log ct +Ψ log xt)
+ λt
·
Mt−1 + Tt
Pt
− atct
¸
(14)
+ µt
"
wt
Ã
1− xt −
µ
1− at
AFevt
¶ 1
γ
ct
!
+ rtkt−1 +
Mt−1 + Tt
Pt
− ct − kt −
Mt
Pt
#
}.
The first-order conditions with respect to ct, xt, kt, at,Mt are
1
ct
− λtat − µtwt
µ
1− at
AFevt
¶ 1
γ
− µt = 0, (15)
Ψ
xt
− µtwt = 0, (16)
−µt + βEt
©
µt+1rt+1
ª
= 0, (17)
−λtct + µtwtct
1
γAFevt
µ
1− at
AF evt
¶ 1
γ−1
= 0, (18)
−µt
Pt
+ βEt
½
λt+1 + µt+1
Pt+1
¾
= 0. (19)
A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a set of alloca-
tions {ct, xt, lt, nt, kt, at,Mt}∞t=0, a set of prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, exogenous shock
processes {zt, vt, ut}∞t=0, money supply process and initial conditions k−1 and
M−1 such that given the prices, shocks and government transfers, the allo-
cations solve the consumer’s utility maximization problem, solve the firm’s
profit maximization problem and the goods and labor and money markets
clear.
In a stationary deterministic steady state we use the transformation
pt = PtMt (and also denote real money balances by mt =
Mt
Pt ). There is
no uncertainty and time indices can be dropped, denoting by (∗) the steady
state values and by R∗ = r∗(Θ∗ + 1) the steady state interest factor. In the
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equilibrium, inflation equals the growth rate of the money supply. The first
order conditions (15)-(19) can be simplified to:
R∗ − 1 = w
∗
γ∗A∗F
µ
1− a∗
A∗F
¶ 1
γ−1
, (20)
xt
Ψct
=
1 + a∗(R∗ − 1) + w∗
³
1−a∗
A∗F
´ 1
γ
w∗
, (21)
r∗ =
1
β
. (22)
Equations (20)-(22) together with the steady-state versions of equations
(2)-(6) and (11)-(13) define the steady state of the system.
2.2 Calibration and Numerical Dynamics Solution
The model is solved by using the log-linearization technique of King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (1987), Campbell (1994) and Uhlig (1995). A first-order Tay-
lor approximation of the log variables around the steady state results in 12
equations for the first-order conditions of the consumer and firm, and the
constraints, together with the productivity and money supply shocks pro-
cesses (4), (6) and (9).3 This gives a system of linear stochastic diﬀerence
equations in the log-linearized endogenous state variable kˆt, the exogenous
state variables zt, vt, ut, and the log-linearized endogenous control variables,
cˆt, xˆt, nˆt, lˆFt, aˆt, wˆt, rˆt, yˆt, pˆt and shadow prices λˆt, µˆt.
Solving the stochastic diﬀerence equations system above means determin-
ing a recursive equilibrium law of motion of the endogenous variableX
0
t = [kˆt]
and Y
0
t = [cˆt xˆt nˆt lˆFt aˆt wˆt rˆt yˆt pˆt] on the lagged values of the
endogenous state variable X
0
t−1 = [kˆt−1] and on the current values of the
exogenous state variables Z
0
t = [zt vt ut]. The solution has the form:
Xt = PP Xt−1 +QQ Zt, (23)
Yt = RR Xt−1 + SS Zt, (24)
where PP , QQ, RR, SS are coeﬃcient matrixes.
3The details of the log-linearization can be found in Benk, Gillman, and Kejak (2004).
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The US economy is the benchmark for calibration of parameters, which
are chosen as close as possible to the values in the literature (Cooley and
Hansen (1989), Cooley and Hansen (1995), Gillman and Kejak (2005)). The
length of a period is assumed to be one quarter. The quarterly discount factor
is assumed to be β = 0.99. This implies through equation (22) a quarterly
net real return of 1%. The depreciation rate is set equal to δ = 0.025 and the
share of capital input is set equal to α = 0.36.
Regarding the parameters of the exchange technology, the degree of di-
minishing return in the credit sector is set to γ = 0.21, which is Gillman
and Otto’s (2003) time series estimate of γ in a related model for the US
(values of γ ∈ (0, 0.5) give a convex, upward-sloping, marginal cost curve).
The share of cash purchases is fixed at a = 0.7 as in Gillman and Kejak
(2005). With a baseline nominal interest rate of 2.25%, explained below, the
productivity parameter AF is then implied to be 1.422.
The baseline proportion of time allocated to leisure is set at xt = 0.7055,
similar to the 0.7 in Gillman and Kejak (2005) and the 0.69 in Jones, Rodolfo,
and Rossi (1993). Then, the steady-state first order conditions imply the
amount of hours spent in credit services production, lF = 0.00049. This
quarterly value when annualized is close in value to the annual value of
0.0014 in Gillman and Kejak (2005).
For the shock processes, the standard deviations and autocorrelations
need values. The standard deviation of disturbances to the goods produc-
tion technology is calibrated so that the standard deviation of the simulated
output series is near to the standard deviation of the US output, giving
σz = 0.0075 (as compared to 0.00721 in Cooley and Hansen (1989)). Per-
sistence is set equal to ϕz = 0.95, as is common.
The money supply process is calibrated so that the money supply varies in
a way that is consistent with the US experience between 1959-2000. Following
Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Cooley and Hansen (1995) the persistence and
the variance of the money supply is estimated from the following regression
for the money supply growth (standard errors in parentheses):
∆logMt = 0.005139
(0.0011)
+ 0.576748
(0.065)
∆logMt−1 + t, σ = 0.010022. (25)
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This implies ϕu = 0.58, σu = 0.01, close to Cooley and Hansen (1995)
estimates of 0.49 and 0.0089 for the period 1954-1991. The regression above
also implies an average growth rate of money (E∆ logMt) of 1.23% per
quarter, which is around 5% per year. And a 1.23% quarterly inflation rate
plus a 1% real interest rate implies a 2.25% quarterly nominal interest rate.
Finally, values for the credit shock generation process are required. While
the persistence of the aggregate output is typically estimated from the Solow
residual, this is more diﬃcult to do for a specific sector, such as the credit
sector. Instead, it is assumed that the credit shock process has the same
standard deviation and autocorrelation as in the aggregate goods sector, or
that σv = 0.0075 and ϕv = 0.95. This assumption proves reasonable as
is seen below in that the estimated autocorrelation is close to the assumed
value.
Given the values for the parameters and the steady state variables, the
recursive system of linear stochastic diﬀerence equations is solved using the
methods of Uhlig (1995). Here the MATLAB program provided online by
Uhlig is adapted for our model, and the solution given by equations (23) and
(24) takes the form
kˆt = 0.953kˆt−1 + 0.117zt − 0.0003vt + 0.007ut, (26)


cˆt
xˆt
nˆt
lˆFt
aˆt
wˆt
rˆt
pˆt
yˆt


=


0.564
0.110
−0.265
0.100
0.042
0.456
−0.028
−0.606
0.190


h
kˆt−1
i
+


0.399 0.014 −0.120
−0.321 −0.005 0.002
0.772 0.011 −0.023
−0.551 0.056 10.430
0.085 −0.432 −0.949
0.722 −0.004 0.008
0.052 0.0002 −0.001
−0.485 0.4184 1.068
1.494 0.007 −0.015




zt
vt
ut

 .
(27)
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2.3 Impulse Responses of the Credit Shock
The recursive equilibrium laws of motion determined in the previous section
permit computation of the impulse responses of shocks on the variables of the
model. Figure 1 illustrates the impulse responses of the credit economy when
faced with a 1% shock to the productivity of the banking sector. Intuitively,
financial innovation and productivity growth in the banking sector decreases
the cost of using credit relative to cash, inducing an increase in demand for
credit and a decrease in the demand for cash. The share of cash purchases
falls by 0.43% while the real money demand drops by 0.42%, this drop being
equivalent with an immediate upward jump in the nominal price level. The
price level jumps up, given that there is the same money supply and less
money demand, and adjusts back to its long-run growth path after the shock.
This causes inflation to converge from below to its long-run level.
The fall in the cost of credit lowers the shadow exchange cost of con-
sumption goods relative to leisure and induces substitution consumption from
leisure. This involves an increase in consumption of 0.014% and a decrease
in leisure of 0.005%. With more eﬃcient labor in the credit sector, and less
leisure, labor in the goods sector increases by 0.01%. The modestly increased
labor supply somewhat lowers the real wage and the input price ratio (w/r)
by about 0.004%. This results in a decrease in the capital to labor ratio,
in contrast to a Tobin (1965) type eﬀect. The time spent in the banking
sector increases by 0.056%. However note that if the credit productivity
parameter is calibrated to be large enough, then the time spent in banking
can potentially decrease. This results when there is a large enough shift out
in the credit services output, from the productivity boost, that less labor is
required in the end.
In sum, a positive credit productivity shock sees the economy have in-
creased work, consumption, output, prices and banking, with less leisure,
capital, and real money use.
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Figure 1. Impulse responses to 1 % credit productivity shock
3 Results: The Construction of Credit shocks
The eﬀects of the changes in banking laws on the business cycle can be
studied by identifying the magnitude of the credit shocks, and their eﬀects
on output, and then by comparing these eﬀects with the chronology of the
deregulation. First is the construction of the three shocks, zt, vt and ut,
in each period from 1972:1 to 2000:4. This is done by assigning values to
certain control and state variables, using US quarterly data, substituting
the values back into the solution to the recursive equilibrium system given
in equation (26) and (27), and then solving for zt, vt and ut. The choice
of the control variables that are assigned values using data is made on the
simple basis of using as many variables for which there is reliable data, while
trying to include key variables like labor hours in banking. The banking
hours is the limiting factor in the data range, beginning only in 1972. The
result is five variables: output, consumption, investment, banking hours and
real money.4 Having five equations in the three unknown shocks gives an
4The data sources is the IMF online IFS database for all variables except the hours
in banking, which is from the online Bureau of Labor Statistics. For this series, the
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overidentification of the shocks, while in contrast with only three equations
there would be an exact identification. Overidentification still allows for a
unique determination of the three shocks through an estimation procedure.
This is done with ordinary least squares as described below.
Given the five control variables with values fromUS data, the log-deviations
of these variables yˆt, cˆt, ıˆt, lˆFt and mˆt are defined as the percentage deviations
of the variables in each period relative to their H-P filtered trend. Next is
the construction of the state variable, the capital stock. Following Chari, Ke-
hoe, and McGrattan (2003), this variable is constructed by using the capital
accumulation equation, the investment data, and an assumed value for the
initial capital stock. With the data on investment used to compute ıˆt, the
cyclical component of the H-P filtered series, the initial value choice of the
log-linearized capital stock kˆ−1 is set equal to 0. Then the log-linearization
of the capital accumulation equation (10) is used to generate kˆt.
The five equations with the now given values for yˆt, cˆt, ıˆt, lˆFt, mˆt, and kˆt,
allow for the ordinary least squares estimation of the three unknown shocks,
zt, vt and ut. To illustrate this, rewrite equation (27) in matrix form as
Xt = A[kˆt−1] +BEt,
where A and B are the coeﬃcient matrices from equation (27), and
Xt = [yˆt cˆt ıˆt lˆFt mˆt]0,
Et = [zt vt ut]0.
For this system of five linear equations in three unknowns, for each t the
ordinary least squares estimate of E˜t is found from the formula:
E˜t = (B0B)−1B0(Xt −A[kˆt−1]). (28)
The magnitudes of the shocks are plotted in Figure 2.
Commercial Banks sector is used, where the hour series is the product of the two series,
"average weekly hours of production workers" and "production workers, thousands". This
data is at a monthly frequency, and it is converted to a quarterly basis using a simple
three month average.
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Figure 2. Evolution of productivity (z), credit (v) and money (u) shocks (u on
the right axis)
The estimated autocorrelation coeﬃcients, with ρ denoting estimated values,
are ρz = 0.9203, ρv = 0.9362, and ρu = 0.6564, which are found by fitting an
AR(1) model to the shocks and which compare well to the assumed values
of ϕz = 0.95, ϕv = 0.95, and ϕu = 0.57. The variance of credit shocks
appears to be larger than the variance of the productivity shocks, while
the assumption is that they are the same. The diﬀerence can be because
the aggregation of the sectoral shocks into a cumulative shock zt results
in the smoothing of idiosyncratic sectoral shocks, and a smaller variance
relative to some individual sectors such as the credit sector. Using the larger
estimated variance for the credit shock in simulations results in somewhat
altered correlations amongst variables, but does not aﬀect the construction
of the magnitude of the shock or its eﬀect on GDP.
3.1 Eﬀect of the Credit Shock on Output
Given the construction of vt, two measures can be determined that help
illustrate how the credit shock eﬀects the economy. These are the period-
by-period innovations to the credit shock process (vt), and a measure of the
eﬀect of the credit shock on GDP. The innovations are computed directly
from equation (6) by substituting in the values for vt and the estimated
value for the autocorrelation parameter, ρv = 0.9362. These are graphed in
Figure 3, plotted on the left axis, along with the vt themselves.
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Second, consider defining a measure of the eﬀect of credit shocks on GDP
that uses the ratio of the actual GDP to the simulated GDP when it is as-
sumed that the credit shocks vt are each equal to zero. Taking this ratio and
subtracting one gives the percentage deviation of actual GDP from the sim-
ulated GDP with no credit shocks, or GDPactualGDP |v=0 −1. The result is a measure of
how much higher GDP was during the period as a result of the credit shocks
taking on the values that are estimated in equation (28). This is graphed also
in Figure 3, plotted on the right axis. The graphs show that the individual
credit shock innovations tend to bunch up in positive and negative directions
and so cumulate to create the shocks vt and the cyclical changes in output
with some lag.
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Figure 3. Credit innovations (ˆvt), the credit shock ( vt ), and the eﬀect of credit
shocks on GDP (GDPactualGDP |v=0 −1)
3.2 Robustness of the Credit Shock Construction
The construction of the economy’s three shocks uses five variables in the
baseline calculation. Alternatively the combinations of five variables taken
four at a time, and five taken three at a time, allow for 15 more possible ways
to construct the credit shock vt. All fifteen of these were computed, and Fig-
ure 4 graphs six of these along with the baseline. The results show that
all variable combinations that include real money, labor hours in banking,
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and either output or investment, generate nearly the same figure. The other
combination presented in Figure 4 is money, banking hours and consump-
tion, which shows conformity in the second part of the period but appears
rather random in the first part of the period. Other combinations show such
randomness and a lack of conformity for the whole period.
The interpretation of these results is that as long as the variables are in-
cluded that correspond to the model’s sectors in which the three shocks occur,
then the results have a non-random form that allow for further interpretation.
In particular, the real money, banking hours and output variables correspond
directly to the sectors in which the money, credit and output shocks occur.
As a qualification, the investment variable instead of output gives similar re-
sults. Given the standard business cycle evidence of how investment reflects
well the goods sector productivity shock, this substitutability of investment
for output is not surprising. Further, because it is also well known that the
consumption series does not reflect as well the output productivity shock,
it is not surprising that substitution of consumption for both output and
investment gives a more random result.
Thus the construction is robust within six diﬀerent alternatives for vari-
able combinations, these being yˆt, cˆt, ıˆt, lˆFt, mˆt; yˆt, cˆt, lˆFt, mˆt; yˆt, ıˆt, lˆFt, mˆt;
cˆt, ıˆt, lˆFt, mˆt; yˆt, lˆFt, mˆt; and ıˆt, lˆFt, mˆt. The latter two constructions are
exact identifications that are made without estimation.
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Figure 4. The Credit Shock under Alternative Identifications
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3.3 Variance Decomposition
The construction of the credit shock makes use of the autocorrelation coeﬃ-
cient ϕv, for the credit shock process given in equation (6), when it uses the
recursive equilibrium solution found in equations (26 and 27). This coeﬃ-
cient is then estimated from an AR(1) process for the resulting credit shock
series vt. And then the shock innovations vt are computed with the time se-
ries vt and its estimated autocorrelation. The closeness in value between the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient that is assumed in the construction (ϕv = 0.95)
and its estimated value using the constructed shock (ρv = 0.9362) is in a
sense a further check on the consistency of the credit shock construction.
The standard deviation of the shock processes is not used in the shock
construction, although it is used in simulations of the economy for the impulse
responses. As an additional step to characterize the credit shock process, the
results are presented here of a study of the contribution of the shocks to the
variance of the output. Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994) show that
the contribution to the variance of output from a particular shock can vary
widely depending on its VAR ordering. Results for the Section 2 economy
confirm this. Alternative variance decompositions of the three shocks were
made using all possible alternative constructions of the shocks, and under
all possible VAR orderings. The distribution of these variances varies sig-
nificantly with each of the three possible VAR orderings. The distributions
presented in Figure 5 are for the credit shock when ordered first (left-hand
side) and second, using the alternative constructions with all possible com-
binations of the five variables (yˆt, cˆt, ıˆt, lˆFt, mˆt) that contain at least the
real money, banking hours and either output and investment (a total of 12
observations for each VAR ordering). The credit shock shows some bunching
around 10%.
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Figure 5. Distribution of the Variance Decompositions of the Credit Shock,
with 1st and 2nd Orderings.
Sample: 1 116   
Included observations: 116 
Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations 
Z,V(-i) Z,V(+i) i  lag  lead 
       ***| .       |         ***| .       |   0 -0.2859 -0.2859 
      ****| .       |          **| .       |   1 -0.3869 -0.1614 
     *****| .       |          .*| .       |   2 -0.4487 -0.0574 
     *****| .       |          . | .       |   3 -0.4721  0.0439 
     *****| .       |          . |*.       |   4 -0.4627  0.1308 
      ****| .       |          . |**       |   5 -0.4327  0.2087 
      ****| .       |          . |***      |   6 -0.3788  0.2682 
       ***| .       |          . |***      |   7 -0.3075  0.3107 
        **| .       |          . |***      |   8 -0.2228  0.3388 
        .*| .       |          . |****     |   9 -0.1385  0.3585 
        .*| .       |          . |****     |  10 -0.0548  0.3929 
 
Table 1: Cross-correlations between the output sector and credit sector
shocks.
Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994) point out that only when shocks
are completely uncorrelated with each other will the variance decomposition
be unique. Table 1 illustrates for example the non-zero correlations between
the output and credit sector shocks for the baseline construction. They range
from positive to negative, over the one-period lag and one-period lead. This is
the correlation that gives rise to the variation in the variance decomposition.
However, despite finding such variation in the fraction of the variance of
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output explained by the credit shock, it is important to note that the credit
shock construction remains unaﬀected by this variation.
4 Credit Shocks and Banking Deregulation
The credit shock innovations and their eﬀect on GDP, graphed in Figure 3,
appear to have some significant chronological conformity to the timing of
banking reform legislation during the period. To see this, consider first an
outline of the deregulatory era and its major acts, the timing of the business
cycles during the period, how the acts fall within the cycles, and finally the
degree to which the credit shocks appear to coincide with the acts.
4.1 Legislative Events
The US banking crises of the 1930s in the US led to regulations designed
to increase the soundness of the banking system. This restricted the scope
of banking geographically and vertically, while prohibiting the payment of
interest on demand deposits and putting a ceiling on interest rates payable
on time deposits (The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, Regulation Q). High
inflation during the 1960s and 1970s caused interest rates to rise above the
ceilings, made it diﬃcult for banks to compete for deposit funds, and led to
the expansion of unregulated money market funds. This created pressure to
deregulate.
There were five major acts during this period, with a sixth falling at the
end of the period under study. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 phased out the deposit interest
rate ceilings and allowed checkable deposits that paid a market interest rate.
A second major step in the deregulatory process was the Garn-St Germain
Act of 1982, which authorized banks and other depository institutions to
oﬀer money market deposit accounts that could compete with money market
mutual funds5.
The end of the 1980s brought a crisis to the savings and loan sector in
5For more detailed explanations regarding banking legislation see Mishkin (1997).
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the US, apparently a fall-out of the innovation in the other parts of the
banking sector and of the 1986 repeal of highly favorable tax write-oﬀs for
real estate limited partnerships that were enacted in the major tax act of
1981. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991 (FDICIA) provided for a restructuring of the savings and
loan sector that enabled it to compete anew on a more level basis with the
rest of the financial industry. The FIRREA created the Resolution Trust
Company (RTC) which made closure easier, equalized rules for savings and
loans relative to banks, extended FDIC insurance to savings and loans, and
the facilitated the conversion of savings and loans to banks. The FDICIA
in contrast increased the cost of deposit insurance with risk-based premiums
and allowed savings and loans to fail more easily by discouraging bail-outs.6
The 1990s saw the elimination of most of the remaining restrictions from
the 1930s regulatory acts. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch-
ing Eﬃciency Act of 1994 repealed the McFadden Act and allowed interstate
bank branching and consolidation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed mergers between commercial
banks, insurance companies and investment banks. Together these Acts evi-
dently increased competition, generated greater eﬃciencies and increased the
productivity in the banking sector7.
4.2 Correlation of Shock-induced GDPmovements with
Law Changes
The eﬀect of the deregulatory acts can be viewed within the business cy-
cle framework. Consider first a definition of the cycles during the period
1972:1 to 2000:4, using the Bry and Boschan (1971) technique, and their
brief characterization. Table 2 reports the duration (quarters) and ampli-
tude (percent of GDP) of the cycles, as well as Harding and Pagan (2002)
6See Hanc (1998) for a detailed analysis.
7See Guzman (2003) for details on financial deregulations in the 90s. Strahan docu-
ments other US changes. Cetorelli (2004) finds evidence of greater competition in banking
in the EU following deregulation of the finance sector.
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measures of the cumulative movements (total gain/loss during the cycle, in
percent) and excess movements (the deviation of the cumulative movements
from its approximation by a triangle, in percent). The first column reports
the averages of these measures for the postwar US data, and the other column
report the particular values for the cycles of the period. The results show for
example a longer than average duration, a higher than average amplitude,
and a greater cumulative total for the expansions starting in 1982 and in
1991, during which time most of the major financial deregulations occurred.
Also in evidence is a stronger expansion (more cumulative GDP increase) for
the short one starting in 1980:III and the longer one starting in 1982:III, as
implied by a lower excess measure as compared to the average.
US 1973:IV& 1980:I& 1981:III& 1990:II&
avg. 1975:I% 1980:III% 1982:III% 1991:I%
Duration
Peak&Trough 3.17 5 2 4 3
Trough%Peak 24 20 4 31 39
Amplitude
Peak&Trough -2.02 -3.40 -2.19 -2.86 -1.49
Trough%Peak 28.87 23.66 4.26 37.04 39.39
Cumulation
Peak&Trough -2.65 -5.06 -2.04 -6.40 -1.19
Trough%Peak 423.79 252.43 8.57 603.20 668.06
Excess
Peak&Trough -0.58 -1.04 -0.62 -0.19 -0.60
Trough%Peak 1.02 -0.20 0.51 -0.34 3.07
Table 2. Cycle characteristics: post-war averages, and individual cycle values
The dating of the cycles and their characterization are consistent with
the possibility that the major financial deregulations of the early 1980s and
early to mid 1990s helped boost output. Analysis of the credit shock inno-
vations strengthens the evidence that the banking legislation contributed to
the source of the increases in GDP during these expansions. Figure 3 shows
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a positive credit shock lasting from 1980 to 1983, and another from 1983
to 1986; the innovations to the credit shocks show spikes that correspond
to the period following the introduction of the two early 1980s deregulatory
acts. Similar positive innovation spikes and credit shocks follow the 1989 and
1994 acts. Thus these four acts coincide closely with the four positive credit
shocks that increased GDP during this period. The 1999 act also correlates
closely to an innovation spike seen to occur at the end of the period.
Also of interest are the negative eﬀects of the credit shocks on GDP. There
are three larger such eﬀects, occurring from 1976 to 1980, 1986 to 1989, and
from 1992 to 1996, caused by innovations somewhat preceding these periods.
In terms of the acts, the enactment of the 1991 FDICIA act is followed by
some negative spikes that caused the 1986 to 1989 negative eﬀect of the credit
shock. The 1991 act increased costs to the savings and loans, while allowing
for easier closures, and there was a significant consolidation of the savings
and loans sector following this act, involving the many closures; these eﬀects
may have caused an initially negative eﬀect on output.
The negative shock of 1976 to 1980 is interpreted as being a result of
the banks bumping up against restrictive financial industry regulation. In
particular, in 1976 to 1980 banks faced binding constraints from Regulation
Q, as the inflation rate shot up, that suddenly inhibited their intermediation
ability. This could have created the negative spikes at that time. The neg-
ative credit shock from 1986 to 1989 conceivably is related to the ending in
1986 of a highly favorable tax treatment for the real estate industry. The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the limited partnership write-oﬀs for real
estate investments through which limited partners could get (from unused
write-oﬀs of general partners) up to eight times the value of their investment
in write-oﬀs that directly reduced their taxable income. This allowed for
economically unattractive investment projects to be attractive nonetheless
because of the tax law. The 1986 act was viewed as "bursting a bubble"
in real estate investment. With the savings and loans’s returns propped up
by assets weighted heavily in such real estate, this 1986 reform may have
triggered the collapse of the savings and loans and its subsequent reform and
deregulation. In evidence in 1986 is a strong negative credit shock innovation
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that preceded the 1986 to 1989 negative eﬀect on GDP of the credit shock,
and that coincides in time to the 1986 law change.
5 Discussion
Uhlig (2003), taking an atheoretical approach, finds two main shocks which
are able to explain more than 90% of the movements in US GDP. He inter-
prets these shocks in terms of a list of the "prime suspects" of business cycle
propagation. One of these is a medium-run shock that is found to be similar
to the typical output productivity shock. The other is a shorter term shock
that he finds does not fit well the characteristics of any of the shocks on his
list of candidate shocks. A comparison shows that the credit shock of our
model has several similar features of Uhlig’s (2003) short-term shock.
In particular, the real side of the economy compares closely while the
nominal side shows less congruence. On the real side, the impulse responses
of output, consumption, labor hours are similar for the Section 2 model’s
credit shock and for Uhlig’s (2003) short-term shock. The real wage rate
response to the credit shock can be compared to the labor productivity re-
sponse for the short term shock in Uhlig (2003). Both fall after the shock
and then gradually adjust back; the pattern of the credit shock is especially
similar in the decomposition case in Uhlig (2003) for which θ is equal to 150.
Note however that while the credit shock impulse responses die out by con-
struction, there is some persistence evident in the Uhlig (2003) short term
shock.
On the nominal side, the model’s inflation rate response matches the
short term shock response of Uhlig (2003) to some degree. The pattern of
the model’s inflation rate from the second period on is very similar to that
of Uhlig’s (2003) PPI inflation. And the pattern of the model’s inflation
rate impulse response to the credit shock is similar to the Uhlig (2003) CPI
inflation impulse response in that in both there is a positive jump that then
turns negative. However in the model the jump is immediate and in Uhlig
(2003) it is gradual, possibly explained by a lack of price stickiness in the
credit model; and the model’s nominal interest rate response compares less
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well with the federal funds response in Uhlig (2003), possibly for a related
reason.
6 Conclusions
The paper analyzes a stochastic version of the Gillman and Kejak (2005)
monetary economy with a payments technology for exchange credit. Deter-
ministically this credit technology has been useful in explaining the eﬀect of
inflation on growth (Gillman and Kejak 2005), the role of financial develop-
ment in the inflation-growth evidence (Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004),
and in explaining Tobin (1965) evidence (Gillman and Nakov 2003), as well
as for allowing for a liquidity eﬀect to be postulated (Li 2000). Applied to
the business cycle, a shock to credit productivity allows for a new focus on
shocks besides the goods productivity and money supply shocks. The pa-
per constructs the credit shock by solving the recursive equilibrium system,
substituting in data for the endogenous variables in the equilibrium solution,
and then either estimating or solving for each of the three shocks, in a proce-
dure related to Parkin (1988), Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994), and
Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1997). The construction is found to be
robust to the use of several diﬀerent data sets, with the condition that data
for variables from the sectors being shocked needs to be included in the con-
struction. The credit shock innovations show congruence with change in US
banking laws during the financial deregulatory era of the 1980s and 1990s.
The idea that a credit shock can aﬀect aggregate productivity and be linked
to changes in government policy is not inconsistent with the conclusions of
Kehoe and Prescott (2002) that depressions across the world have resulted
from shocks to productivity related to government policy changes. Indeed
it would be interesting to apply the analysis of the paper to the US 1930s
depression period, although data on the bank sector may be a constraining
factor.
The credit shock also shows similar features to a key shock identified by
Uhlig (2003). He finds that two shocks explain the majority of the movements
in GNP: a medium-run one similar to the goods productivity shock, and
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another shorter term one that lacks similarities with the candidate shocks
that Uhlig (2003) considers. The credit shock of this model parallels the
eﬀect of this second shorter term shock on the real side of the economy.
This strengthens the case for considering the credit shock as a potentially
important candidate shock that can contribute significantly to business cycle
movements.
Another approach in the business cycle literature is that of Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2003) who decompose the shocks into diﬀerent sources of
marginal distortions. How the credit shock identified here may fit into their
productivity, labor tax, and capital tax wedges may be worth further study.
Since their labor tax distorts the leisure-labor margin in a way similar to the
inflation tax in a monetary model, and both the cost of credit and the cost of
money aﬀect this margin in the model of this paper, the credit shocks might
partly be accounted for through this wedge.
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